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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most class action securities cases result in a settlement where the parties agree on a 
defined amount of money to be placed in a fund for distribution to eligible beneficiaries. 
Although the size of the fund and the losses suffered by eligible beneficiaries are defined, 
the number of potential beneficiaries who decide not to participate in the settlement by 
opting out and the number and value of losses eventually claimed by those eligible 
beneficiaries are not known until long after the settlement amount has been established. 
In any closed-end fund, like the securities class action settlements, there is the potential 
for a ―Goldilocks‖ dilemma—the fund may be too large or too small for the claims being 
made, not ―just right.‖ The ensuing tensions created by this mismatch between funds 
 
 Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law, Durham, North Carolina. Professor McGovern served as a 
court appointed neutral in the cases described in this Article. Special thanks to ILEP conference organizer Ed 
Labaton, moderator James Cox, and panelists Lynn Powalski and Joy Ann Bull as well as Nancy Baker, Roger 
Bauser, Peter Crudo, Pat Ebener, Jeff Leibell, Dan Marotto, and Barry Weprin for commenting on the ILEP 
presentation and assisting with the earlier drafts of this Article. In addition, recognition is due to the editorial 
staff of the Journal for ensuring that this Article met the standards of the Journal of Corporation Law. 
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available and claims on those funds can be one of the most significant problems in any 
settlement fund distribution. The ability of courts, special masters, and claims 
administrators to cope with this mismatch is critical to the success of the distribution 
process. Courts, lawyers, academics, and claims administrators have generally accepted 
the traditional approaches normally taken in securities class action distribution processes 
as appropriate under the circumstances. This Article presents several alternative 
approaches for coping with the mismatch dilemma that are worthy of consideration for 
incorporation in future distributions. The literature on distribution processes has given too 
little attention to the successes and failures in cases that have utilized non-traditional 
techniques, and it is likely that future distributions can benefit from these actual 
experiences. The following case studies in both securities and non-securities contexts 
illustrate the Goldilocks dilemmas that arise and discuss approaches that courts, lawyers, 
and claims administrators might take to ameliorate them in situations where there are too 
many opt-outs, too few claims, too many claims, too little money, or too much money.  
II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES 
The traditional approaches for coping with the mismatch between available funds 
and funding needs are to use pro-ration when there is a shortage and cy pres when there is 
an excess.1 The general assumptions underlying these approaches are that the distribution 
process is a sunk cost and any additional distribution costs would be inefficient, 
counterproductive, or both.2 At the same time, it is possible to use pro-ration and cy-pres 
to reach an outcome that most viewers would consider satisfactory—the process of 
satisficing. The argument here is that there are changes both in the pre- and post-
distribution processes that can ameliorate the degree of mismatch and should be 
considered in anticipation that a mismatch might occur. That is, the distribution process 
itself should incorporate techniques for coping with the mismatch rather than waiting 
until the precise mismatch is known. The distribution process should not assume that new 
techniques are inappropriate, even if they have not been approved by an appellate court 




 1. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (Proposed Final Draft 2009), 
available at http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=80; 
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and 
Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 
58 STAN L. REV. 411 (2005) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip]; James D. Cox & Randall S. 
Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class 
Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855 (2002) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money]. 
 2. Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money, supra note 1, at 878, 879; Robert H. Klonoff, Mark Herrmann & 
Bradley W. Harrison, Making Class Actions Work: The Untapped Potential of the Internet, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 
727, 730–33, 750 (2008).  
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III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
A. Surveys  
It is often possible to gain a greater appreciation of the nature of mismatch problems 
by surveying a sample of the universe of participants who seem to be exacerbating the 
problem. If, for example, claimants have misunderstood the claiming process, they may 
be able to be recategorized into a more appropriate claiming status. Surveys can be 
implemented quickly to identify reasons for higher or lower than expected response rates. 
Survey results can then inform mid-course corrections in a distribution process. In one 
case, for example, survey results showed that the main reason for failure to file a claim 
was related to a misunderstanding of the potential compensation.3 Using this information 
the claims administrator could add the estimated losses to future outreach initiatives, 
thereby increasing response rates.  
B. Filters  
It is normal for a settlement agreement to define certain criteria for determining 
eligibility for compensation in a settlement; in other words, to identify true positives. In 
implementing those criteria, there is often a great deal of flexibility in the distribution 
process for establishing filters, other than straight pro-ration, to deal with any anticipated 
shortfall in distribution funds. By looking at the rationale for the settlement, or the nature 
of the alleged wrongdoing, it may be possible to establish filters that perform a more 
equitable triage function. These filters may enable the shortage of money to be borne less 
evenly but more equitably.  
C. Claim Forms  
Most class action securities cases are handled by claims administrators who develop 
claim forms that vary from case to case and from claims administrator to claims 
administrator, resulting in a lack of standardization.4  At the same time, these forms often 
tend to be focused on legal and administrative needs rather than on the needs of the 
claimant.5 It is now possible to have multiple forms to meet all of those needs: electronic 
forms, web forms, pre-populated forms, certification forms, option forms, and many 
others to reduce the burden of filing and claim processing. By tailoring forms to certain 
claimants and standardizing forms for others, it may be possible to increase response 
rates significantly. 
 
 3.  SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at 
http://www.globalresearchanalystsettlement.com/memorandum.pdf. 
 4.  For an illustration of the variation among claim forms see the cases described on claims 
administrators’ websites, for example, The Garden City Group, Inc., http://www.gardencitygroup.com (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2009), and Gilardi & Co., LLC, http://www.gilardiandcompany.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2009); 
Rust Consulting, http://www.rustconsulting.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).  
 5. Federal Judicial Center, Section on Class Action Notices, Securities Class Action Certification and 
Settlement: Full Notice, available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openform& 
url_r=pages/376. In In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1409, M 21-95, 05 Civ. 
7116 (WHP), 04 Civ. 5723 (WHP), slip op. at 12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2009), for example, the forms were 
changed to focus on the needs of consumers by having a series of options.  
McGovern_Final.docx                                          Do Not Delete                                                          11/23/2009 12:54 PM 
126 The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 35:1 
D. Outreach  
In an effort to meet the legal requirements for notice and to conserve funds for 
eventual distribution by minimizing transaction costs, there has been a standard outreach 
process for class action securities distributions.6 There are, however, many new—
generally electronic—methods for increasing outreach, and there are follow-up programs 
that are not necessarily more expensive and that can be more efficient. For example, the 
use of a central website that allows potential claimants to register and receive notice 
online has shown much success.7 Automated follow-ups and deadline reminder messages 
can also increase response rates.  
E. Selective Pro-Ration 
Rather than an across-the-board reduction in claim payments, there are a number of 
more sophisticated methods for pro-rating claims that can be incorporated into a 
distribution plan. Normally the distribution plans are written after the settlement 
agreement has been reached. Anticipating a potential shortfall or excess of funds for 
distribution can lead to provisions in the plan that would allow for a more fine-tuned 
necessary reduction in payments on claims. If, for example, there is a disparity in the 
types of claims—commercial/consumer, large/small, foreign/domestic, quantifiable/ non-
quantifiable, and many others—it is possible to create different pro-ration rules for those 
different categories rather than the one-size-fits-all approach. There may be an 
independent yardstick that provides a more appropriate measure than linear mathematics; 
there may be a progressive staging of pro-ration steps that are not uniform; there may be 
statistical limits for categories of claims that can otherwise impact linear models.  
IV. CASE STUDIES 
A. In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation8  
Forty-two pharmaceutical manufacturers were sued in 2001 for reporting false and 
inflated average wholesale prices for certain types of drugs and for overpayments for the 
affected drugs.9 In 2006, one defendant settled with the plaintiffs for $70 million.10 After 
preliminary approval of the settlement, the claims administrator provided nationwide 
notice by publication, website, and 2.5 million letters that included an explanation of the 
settlement, a claim form, and an opt-out form.11  
Within five months approximately 10,000 consumer claim forms were filed with a 
preliminary estimated average value of about $230, and approximately 20,000 requests 
 
 6. Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip, supra note 1, at 419; Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money, supra 
note 1, at 867, 868. 
 7. See, e.g., Settlement Fund Clearinghouse, http://www.settlementfundclearinghouse.com (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2009); Klonoff, Herrmann & Harrison, supra note 2, at 749, 750. 
 8. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 254 F.R.D. 35 (D.Mass. 2008) (MDL No. 1456), 
as discussed in Francis E. McGovern, Second-Generation Dispute System Design Issues in Managing 
Settlements, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 53, 58–63 (2008). 
 9. Id. at 58. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 59. 
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for exclusion, or ―opt-outs,‖ were received.12 The large number of requests for exclusion, 
relative to the number of claim forms, led to a survey of consumers who filed exclusion 
forms.13 The purpose of the survey was to analyze the responses of claimants in order to 
understand the disparity between claim forms and exclusions. Survey participants 
answered a series of questions to determine (a) whether they were truly class 
members, as opposed to, for example, persons who took an eligible drug but 
had insurance that covered their co-payments, and (b) if they were part of the 
class, why they chose to exclude themselves from the settlement.  
. . . .  
A significant number of those surveyed did not remember taking any of the 
covered drugs, many had insurance that covered their co-payment obligation, 
and many had no recollection of a percentage co-payment or full payment for 
the drug. Of those surveyed, 15.65% were estimated to be actual class members 
based on recalling the covered drugs, being charged for the drugs, and either 
having no insurance or having a percentage co-payment. During the course of 
the phone survey, those determined to be actual class members were told that 
they may be able to reconsider their decision to exclude themselves if they 
wished to do so, and 18% indicated that they were interested in filing a claim. 
This, added to the 16% who said they originally intended to file a claim when 
they submitted the exclusion form, totals 34% of those determined to be class 
members who said they were interested in filing a claim form. The estimates 
derived from the survey were subject to unobserved sampling, response and 
measurement error, but nonetheless provided important insights about the 
eligibility and intention[s] of the opt-outs.14 
Eventually, new claim forms were mailed to everyone who originally filed an 
exclusion form and who indicated an interest in filing a claim form, along with a letter 
saying that they could revoke their exclusion request and file a claim form by a new 
deadline.15 The survey results suggested that 15.65% of 21,365 consumers who had filed 
exclusion forms were, in fact, likely to be members of the class.16 This result extrapolates 
to an estimate of 3344 actual class members who requested to opt out of the settlement. 
In addition, the survey results suggested that some 16% of the actual class members who 
sent in an exclusion form did so under the mistaken view that they were then filing a 
claim; therefore, there would be 535 fewer opt-outs, or an amended total of 2809 actual 
class members who intended to exclude themselves from the settlement.17 
Using the results of the survey, the universe of class members was redefined. 
Ultimately, the number of opt-outs shrunk to a more acceptable number, which allowed 
the administration of the distribution to proceed in accordance with the settlement 
agreement.18  
 
 12. Id.  
 13. McGovern, supra note 8, at 59–60. 
 14. Id. at 60. 
 15. Id. at 60–61. 
 16. Id. at 61. 
 17. Id.  
 18. McGovern, supra note 8, at 62–63. 
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B. In re Foreign Currency Exchange19 
Plaintiff counsel filed an antitrust lawsuit against several credit card companies and 
their related issuing banks, alleging that they had overcharged their customers from one 
to three percent in foreign currency conversion fees in the use of their credit, charge, 
debit, and ATM cards.20 Counsel settled the case with some of the defendants for $336 
million.21 Counsel developed a claim form and a campaign to provide notice as part of 
their settlement agreement.22 The claim form required that an eligible cardholder record 
their annual expenditures in foreign transactions for each of their cards.23 The credit card 
companies enclosed the claims forms with one monthly account statement mailed to 
cardholders.24 The claims administrator provided a website for downloading a claim 
form and a toll free telephone number to answer questions from potential beneficiaries.25 
In the first six months, there were 90,000 claim forms filed—representing a response 
rate of 0.45% in light of the 20.8 million notices mailed to card holders.26 There were 
also complaints filed with the court concerning the detailed reporting requirements in the 
claiming process and inquiring why the expenditure information was not already 
available to the claims administrator in a computerized format from the credit card 
companies.27 The court halted the notice campaign and appointed a special master who 
recommended a new notice and claim form to incorporate three options for 
claimants to choose from depending on their estimated losses and ability to 
thoroughly document their claim: (1) a flat payment of $25; (2) an estimate of 
the number of days spent in foreign countries during the covered time period so 
an algorithm of typical expenses would be applied to estimate a payment; and 
(3) the original form of annual estimates of foreign expenditures by credit 
card. . . . The flat payment option was designed to take advantage of claimants’ 
propensities to make claims only if the form is easy to understand and easy to 
complete, in comparison to having to obtain 10 years of proof of foreign 
spending. Based upon the forms filed prior to June 30, 2007, it was 
recommended that an individual who spent no more than one week abroad or 
had foreign currency expenditures not greater than $2500 would have been 
eligible for a $25 payment that would be consistent with the limited foreign 
conversion fees charged to most cardholders. At the same time, the level of 
potential fraud was reduced from this option because only cardholders who had 
foreign currency expenditures were included in the mailings.  
  
 
 19. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), as discussed in 
McGovern, supra note 8, at 54–58. 
 20. Id. at 54. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. McGovern, supra note 8, at 54. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27.  In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1409, M 21-95, 05 Civ. 7116 (WHP), 04 
Civ. 5723 (WHP), slip op. at 10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2009). 
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 The second option was designed for customers who might feel that $25 was 
inadequate but that compiling annual records was too onerous or not feasible. 
Most foreign travelers can remember how many days they spend overseas 
annually more easily than they can remember how much money they charged 
on their credit cards. In an optimal world, the issuing banks would have had a 
computerized listing of annual charges, but the databases for those charges 
were not accessible for a variety of reasons, including changes in bank 
ownership of cards, changes in card names, and incompatibility resulting from 
changes in databases and their management software over time. By listing the 
number of days spent overseas, however, a claimant would be more likely to 
feel that the settlement payment would be based upon their actual 
circumstances. The calculation of the algorithm could be accomplished from 
publicly available data from the travel industry about foreign expenditures. 
Although the public travel industry data was not a perfect fit, assumptions 
could be made to approximate the annual currency conversion fees based upon 
the number of days spent in a foreign country.  
 The third option was virtually identical to the one offered on the original 
claim form. The resulting cover letter and claim form options were reviewed by 
the lawyers and the claims administrator, and were further refined based on 
testing and feedback obtained from focused interviews with potential 
beneficiaries.28 
The new claim form generated a remarkable 27% response rate, with 10,115,836 
claims filed.29 7,200,413 claimants chose option one, 2,600,315 claimants chose option 
two, and 315,108 claimants chose option three. In addition, approximately 22,000 late 
claims and 2910 requests for exclusion were filed.30  
C. Personal Injury Cases 
There are a number of lessons that can also be learned about settlement fund 
distributions from experiences in connection with personal injury cases. These cases 
often involve determinate amounts of funding and even more indeterminate demands on 
that funding than securities cases. In the Dalkon Shield case there was excess money;31 in 
the asbestos funds there is usually either too much or too little money;32 in the DDT 
cases there were too many claimants;33 and in the Rhode Island Station Fire case34 there 
was a potential conflict among different types of claimants.35 
 
 28. McGovern, supra note 8, at 55–56. 
 29. Id. at 57.  
 30. Id.  
 31.  In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988); Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, The Dalkon 
Shield Claimants Trust, and The Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79, 123 
(1997). 
 32.  Francis E. McGovern, The Evolution of Asbestos Bankruptcy Trust Distribution Plans, 62 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163, 175 (2006).  
 33. Francis E. McGovern, The Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 
1990, at 61, 63, 68.  
 34. Grey v. Derderian, Nos. CA 04-312L, CA 03-483L, 2009 WL 2997066 (D.R.I. Aug. 14, 2009). 
 35. Proposed Plan of Distribution, Grey v. Derderian, Nos. CA 04-312L, CA 03-483L (D.R.I. Mar. 5, 
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A.H. Robins Co. filed for bankruptcy and established a qualified settlement fund for 
persons who had filed claims for personal injuries suffered in connection with the use of 
the Dalkon Shield.36 The fund contained $2.475 billion, the amount estimated during a 
section 502(c) proceeding by the U.S. District Court overseeing the bankruptcy to be the 
full value of the Dalkon Shield claims.37 Approximately five years later, after all the 
claims had been processed and paid, there were significant monies remaining in the 
fund.38 The U.S. District Court decided that the claims process should be supplemented 
and ordered the distribution of the remaining money directly to claimants, regardless of 
whether they were represented by counsel or pro se, so that they received an additional 
85% of their original payment.39  
In the asbestos bankruptcies there have been qualified settlement trusts with very 
detailed trust distribution plans (TDP) designed to cope with the inevitable mismatch 
between available and needed funding.40 Some of the TDPs have a straight payment 
percentage based upon a schedule of benefits negotiated by the claimants as part of the 
TDP.41 Sometimes that percentage is less than 100%.42 In other instances, the schedule 
of benefits is increased to reflect the available assets.43 In other TDPs, there is a collar or 
payment ratio that limits the amount of the funds in a given year that can be paid to 
certain categories of claims.44 In other instances, there are maximum available payments 
or maximum annual payments that can roll over from year to year in the event that a 
certain category of claims does not exhaust the funds available in a given year.45  
In the DDT cases in Triana, Alabama, over 13,000 claimants alleged that they had 
been exposed to DDT from eating catfish.46 There was evidence that DDT had been 
deposited in tributaries of the Tennessee River by a chemical plant, but that large a 
number of persons whose background risk of DDT exceeded normal limits seemed 
excessive. Counsel resolved the lawsuit by creating a single qualified settlement fund.47 
The distribution plan, however, provided that claimants would need to be tested for DDE, 
a metabolite of DDT, in their blood and have a DDE level above normal background 
levels of DDE in order to be compensated.48 If the initial threshold of DDE was 
exceeded, then the claimant could receive compensation.49 Additional compensation was 
made for claimants with multiples of DDE levels and for specific harms for claimants 
 
2009) (No. 1964). 
 36. Vairo, supra note 31, at 123; see generally RICHARD B. SOBEL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF 
THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991) (detailing the history and resolution of the Dalkon Shield litigation). 
 37. Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 659, 685 (1989). 
 38.  Vairo, supra note 31, at 151.  
 39.  Id. 
 40. McGovern, supra note 32, at 175.  
 41. Id. at 174–75. 
 42. Id. at 175 (explaining a fixed percentage payout when not all claims can be paid in full). 
 43. Id. at 174 (noting that the percentage may change over time). 
 44. Id. 
 45. McGovern, supra note 32, at 174.  
 46. McGovern, supra note 33, at 67.  
 47. Id. at 63–64. 
 48. Id. at 72–75 (discussing settlement plans and criteria). 
 49. Id. at 75 (listing testing for DDE and regulating levels above expected background as requirements for 
payment). 
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with excessive DDE in their blood.50 Needless to say, the number of eligible claimants 
was substantially reduced.51 
The Rhode Island Station Fire Settlement fund was based upon a ―point system‖ 
allocation formula.52 There was a negotiation among the lawyers representing the 
claimants to establish a consensus on a yardstick that was commensurate with normal tort 
system values.53 The point system used a base case with a predetermined number of 
points for all personal injury and wrongful death cases.54 The system then included 
provisions allowing additional points for more substantial harm factors also derived from 
tort system values.55 Once the point system was agreed to by the parties and approved by 
the court, each claimant’s points were determined.56 Then all the points were added 
together and divided into the total amount of available settlement money to determine the 
dollar value of each point.57 Once a claimant knew their individual total number of points 
and the value of a point, their payment amount was calculated.58 The potential for 
conflicts among claimants over horizontal and vertical equity was avoided.59  
D. The Global Research Analyst Settlement 
The Global Research Analyst Settlement provides examples of new techniques in 
claim forms, outreach, and triaging claim payments.60 In that case, the SEC brought an 
action against certain brokerage firms alleging wrongdoing by various research 
analysts.61 The case settled for $432.75 million, which was placed in a qualified 
settlement fund for the benefit of purchasers of certain stocks during certain time frames 
from certain defendants, during which there had been alleged wrongdoing by various 
research analysts.62 The court required the defendants to provide the names of all eligible 
purchasers as well as qualifying sales of the applicable securities.63 As a result, it was 
possible to send pre-populated certification forms that contained all the information 
necessary to approve a claim; the claimant was required merely to verify and sign the 
 
 50. Id. at 73–74. 
 51.  McGovern, supra note 33, at 68–72 (reporting the number of plaintiffs having elevated DDT levels to 
be 33%, and the number that alleged specific harms to be even less). 
 52. Proposed Plan of Distribution, Grey v. Derderian, Nos. CA 04-312L, CA 03-483L (D.R.I. Mar. 5, 
2009) (No. 1964). 
 53. Id. at 2. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 2–4. 
 56. Proposed Plan of Distribution, Grey, Nos. CA 04-312L, CA 03-483L (D.R.I. Mar. 5, 2009) (No. 
1964). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59. Abby Goodnough, 5 Years After a Nightclub Fire, Survivors Struggle to Remake Their Lives, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, at A18.  
 60. Letter from Francis E. McGovern, Professor of Law, Duke Univ., to the Honorable William H. Pauley 
III, U.S. Dist. Court Judge, S. Dist. of N.Y. (June 5, 2006) at 2, 3, available at 
http://www.globalresearchanalystsettlement.com/letter.pdf (recommending approaches to disburse funds from 
the Global Research Analyst Settlement) [hereinafter McGovern, Letter]. 
 61.  SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 404–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at 
http://www.globalresearchanalystsettlement.com/memorandum.pdf, at 2, 3. 
 62.  Id. at 3. 
 63. Id. (describing requirement to provide transaction data).  
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form.64 This preprinting process resulted in a claim filing rate that was three times greater 
than the normal response rate for securities and other commercial class actions.65 
Notwithstanding the success of the claims process, there were still monies available 
in some of the defendants’ funds, although others had been completely depleted.66 The 
court decided to proceed with a second distribution using state-of-the-art survey research 
methodology in order to reach an unprecedented number of eligible claimants.67 The 
additional techniques included pre-claim form letters to alert eligible purchasers that they 
would be receiving a claim form, follow-up letters, and, in some instances, telephone 
calls to encourage recipients to return their claim forms. Extensive outreach for claimants 
who did not cash their checks was accomplished by mail and by telephone. Some letters 
were sent in a special delivery format to enhance the chances that the recipient would 
focus on them. All of these efforts resulted in increasing the response rate from 46% in 
the first distribution to a total of 70% overall among potential claimants with estimated 
losses, quite impressive given the fact that the second effort involved only those who had 
not responded to the first distribution.68  
For those defendants whose funds were oversubscribed, the court approved a novel 
triaging process that focused on the alleged harms caused by the stock analysts’ 
research—the proximity principle and the information principle: 
 If there is enough money available in a Distribution Fund to meet all claims 
for losses from purchases through the relevant Settling Firm, investors will 
receive 100 cents on the dollar. If, however, there is not enough money to meet 
all claims, then a key goal is to distribute settlement funds to investors who are 
more likely to have been affected by the events that are the subject of the 
settlement. Although that goal may not be perfectly achievable, the plan uses 
two principles to achieve a better approximation of that goal. 
 A. The Proximity Principle 
 The first principle is that purchases of equity securities that were made 
shortly after the events that are the subject of the settlement are more likely to 
have been affected by those events than purchases made more distant in time 
from the events: the proximity principle. This principle is consistent with 
provisions in the Final Judgments. If funds are not sufficient to compensate 
investors in full for their eligible losses, the compensation formula will involve 
a ―proximity adjustment.‖ 
 Specifically, those investors who purchased the equity security closer to the 
beginning of the ―relevant period of purchase‖ will receive a higher 
compensation rate (that is, compensation as a share of eligible losses) than 
those who purchased later. A maximum proximity adjustment rate of three 
percent per trading day will help to ensure an equitable distribution of funds. 
 
 64. Id. at 9 (providing a description of Certification Form). 
 65. Analysis of historical case data compiled for presentation to the court in the Global Research Analyst 
Settlement (on file with the author). 
 66.  McGovern, Letter, supra note 60, at 1, 2. 
 67.  SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 409–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), available at 
http://www.globalresearchanalystsettlement.com/memorandum.pdf, at 12. 
 68.  Id. at  10, 12, 13. 
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The proximity adjustment rate will be set at zero for the first eleven trading 
days of the ―relevant period of purchase.‖ 
 . . . .  
 B. The Information Principle 
 The second principle focuses on the consumption of information prior to 
making equity security purchases: the information principle. Purchasers who 
make larger investments in equity securities are more likely to spend more on 
obtaining information regarding those equity securities. Conversely, purchasers 
of smaller amounts of equity securities are more likely to spend less on 
information. This principle suggests, therefore, that the events that are the 
subject of the settlement are more likely to have affected those investors 
making smaller purchases than those investors making larger purchases. Like 
the proximity principle, the information principle is consistent with provisions 
in the Final Judgments. 
 Specifically, if an investor’s total purchases from a Settling Firm over the 
relevant periods of purchase are larger than the median value for purchases of 
the relevant equity securities from the Settling Firm, the adjustment will equal a 
maximum of three percent for each multiple above the median. The information 
adjustment will not apply to those investors with total purchases from a Settling 
Firm over the relevant periods of purchase that are smaller than the median 
value for purchases of the relevant equity securities from the Settling Firm.69 
 In addition, the court provided for pre- and post-judgment interest, rounding up to 
a minimum $100 payment and payment of late filed claims for those defendants’ funds 
that had not been fully depleted.70 Any remaining funds were to be remitted to the U.S. 
Treasury.71  
V. CONCLUSION 
Closed end settlements in class action securities cases must invariably cope with a 
mismatch between the dollar amount available for distribution and the dollar amount 
actually claimed by eligible beneficiaries. This mismatch occurs because the settlement 
amount becomes fixed before the distribution process begins and the claimed amount can 
be determined. Traditional distribution methodology has primarily concentrated on 
insuring that any shortfall is shared by the eligible beneficiaries evenly in a linear pro-
ration wherein all claims are reduced by the same proportionate amount. Any excess 
monies remaining have been subject to cy pres distribution.  
The suggestion here is that there are additional techniques beyond pro-ration that 
should be considered in coping with the mismatch between distribution funds and 
 
 69. APPENDIX B: GLOBAL RESEARCH ANALYST SETTLEMENT DISTRIBUTION FUND PLAN, available at 
http://www.globalresearchanalystsettlement.com/fund.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 70. SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Nos. 03 Civ. 2937-48, 04 Civ. 6909–10 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009) (order 
directing disbursement of remaining funds), available at http://www.globalresearchanalystsettlement.com/ 
courtorder.pdf. 
 71. Id. 
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claimed funds: surveys to identify excess or insufficient categories of claimants, filters to 
concentrate on true positive claimants, more user friendly forms to reduce the burden of 
participation, more selective proration techniques, secondary distributions, and better 
outreach programs. By ensuring these and many other methods that are articulated in 
social science and marketing research, it is possible to reduce the inevitable mismatch 
and deliver settlement funds more efficiently and equitably with less residual monies 
remaining.  
 
